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Trade policy reforms which lead to changes in world prices of agricultural commodities or 
domestic policies aimed at affecting agricultural prices are often seen as causing a policy 
dilemma: a fall in agricultural prices benefits poor urban consumers but hurts poor rural 
producers, while a rise yields the converse. Poor countries have argued that they need to be 
able to use import protection and/or price support policies to protect themselves against 
volatility in world agricultural prices in order to dampen these effects. In this paper, we 
explore this dilemma in a CGE model of India that uses a new social accounting matrix 
(SAM) developed at the Indira Ghandi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) in 
Mumbai.  The SAM includes extensive disaggregation of agricultural activities, commodity 
markets, labor markets, and rural and urban households. This SAM includes 115 
commodities, 48 labor types and 352 types of households, (classified by social group, income 
class, region, and urban/rural). The CGE model based on this SAM can be used to explore 
the linkages between changes in world prices of agriculture and the incomes of poor rural 
and urban households, capturing rural-urban linkages in both commodity and factor 
markets. The results indicate that the inclusion of linkages between rural and urban labor 
markets is necessary to fully explore, and potentially eliminate, the dilemma. A fall in 
agricultural prices hurts agricultural producers, lowers wages and/or employment of rural 
labor, and in some cases spills over into urban labor markets, depressing wages and incomes 
of poor urban households as well. In these cases both rural and urban poverty increases. The 
paper explores the strength of these commodity and factor market linkages, and the potential 
spillover effects of policies affecting agricultural prices.  
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1.  Introduction and Motivation 
India’s economic growth has accelerated in recent years, and its share of world trade 
has expanded. Yet, despite these recent positive trends, India remains the largest reservoir of 
poverty in the world (Figure 1). Its recent high growth has been driven mainly by its modern 
services sector, which accounts for only a small proportion of overall employment and 
household incomes. Its agricultural sector, where poverty is concentrated, is in a deep crisis. 
The country faces daunting challenges and policy decisions to create employment for its 
burgeoning population and raise incomes across the full range of households, skill levels, 
sectors, and regions. 
India’s bound tariffs are still relatively high, although applied tariffs are much lower. 
Because of this gap, the government currently retains significant policy space with respect to 
trade and agricultural prices, including the ability to raise and lower tariffs in response to 
world price changes and prevailing conditions. In the Doha Development Agenda round of 
negotiations at the World Trade Organization, the Indian government has sought to maintain 
its policy space with respect to agricultural prices.  Specifically, it has sought provisions in 
the Doha round to treat some agricultural commodities as “special products” that would be 
subjected to lesser or no tariff cuts based on considerations such as livelihood security.  It   4
also seeks a “special safeguard mechanism” through which it would retain the ability to raise 
tariffs in response to agricultural price drops or import surges.
3  
The question of the impact of trade liberalization on poverty has long concerned both 
policy makers and the research community; however there has been limited research that 
illuminates the causal relationships.  Most ex post studies of the relationship between changes 
in trade and changes in income levels and distribution (sometimes explicitly including 
poverty) have tended to focus on the manufacturing sector and urban areas.  Since most of the 
world’s poor are in rural areas and more are engaged in agriculture than in manufacturing, 
this body of literature has limited usefulness with respect to poverty implications.  A few 
recent studies that probe the relationship between trade liberalization, including the 
agricultural sector, and poverty are discussed in Section 5, below.   
We use a computable general equilibrium model of the Indian economy to explore the 
impact on Indian households and poverty of changes in global prices for rice and wheat, 
which are the most important food grains in India. Global price changes would have a 
stronger impact on the country’s producers and consumers if the government were to lower 
and bind its agricultural tariffs as a result of the Doha round. We trace the impact of global 
price volatility on the overall economy, factors of production, and households.  Using a new 
social accounting matrix (SAM) for India, we are able to capture the impacts on highly 
disaggregated types of labor and households, including information on social groups (castes, 
tribes, etc.), income levels and location.  We believe that this is the first study that looks at 
                                                  
3 India’s position is supported by a coalition of developing countries known as the G33. The 
G33 includes the following 46 countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, 
Bolivia, Botswana, China, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Rep. Korea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Panama, Peru, Philippines, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe (World Trade Organization, 2007a). 
   5
the impact of global agricultural price changes—and therefore the potential impact of trade 
policy change—on poverty at such a detailed and disaggregated level. 
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 puts the present study in context by 
providing an overview of Indian poverty, agriculture, employment, and trade. The following 
section describes the analytical framework of the study.  Section 4 presents the results. As 
noted, Section 5 briefly reviews the results from several recent studies that attempt to assess 
the impact of trade on poverty in India or globally. A final section suggests policy 
implications of the findings and concludes.  
 
2.  The Context: Indian Poverty, Agriculture, Employment, and Trade 
Although India’s aggregate economy is large, when divided by its 1.1 billion people, 
the resulting per capita income places it in the ranks of low-income countries. Its GDP per 
capita stood at $785 in the most recent measure by the International Monetary Fund, ranking 
it 134th of 185 member countries (International Monetary Fund 2007b). Using the traditional 
purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion, its GDP per capita stands at about $3,800, similar 
to the levels of Nicaragua, Angola, and Vietnam. Using newly revised World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank estimates, GDP per capita is significantly smaller, at about $2,100 (Asian 
Development Bank 2007).   
The vast majority of the population suffers from very low incomes (Figure 1).  The 
new PPP estimates suggest that 792 million people, or 73 percent of the population, live on 
less than $1 per day, while slightly over a billion people, or 94 percent of the population, live 
on less than $2 per day.
4  As measured by the national poverty line, the percentage of the 
population living below the poverty line has fallen in recent years; however due to population 
                                                  
4 Authors’ calculations using the World Bank’s PovcalNet software, 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet. 
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growth, the number of poor people has barely decreased. In 2004–2005, 77 percent of the 
population, totaling 836 million people, had an income below 20 rupees per day (twice the 
official poverty line), which is approximately 50 cents at the current exchange rate (NCEUS 
2007).  
Poverty in India is concentrated in rural areas, as it is in most of the developing world. 
Nearly three-quarters of India’s poor live in the countryside, where the proportion of the 
population living at or below the national poverty line is 28.3 percent, compared with 25.7 
percent in urban areas (National Sample Survey Organisation 2005). This is driven in large 
part by deeply rooted problems and slow growth in the agricultural sector, discussed below. 
Indian poverty is also characterized by an element of ethnicity and caste. Historically, 
disadvantaged castes, tribes, and some other classes suffered discrimination and exclusion 
from many economic opportunities. The Indian Constitution recognizes the groups that have 
been disadvantaged and the government has accorded compensatory advantages to try to 
redress the effects.  The Constitution and laws establish specific opportunities for groups 
officially identified as “scheduled tribes” (ST), “scheduled castes” (SC), and “other backward 
classes” (OBC). Nonetheless, these groups continue to suffer considerably higher levels of 
poverty and more exclusion than other groups. In the government’s 1999–2000 survey, the 
proportions of people below the official poverty line were 45.8 percent for “scheduled 
tribes,” 35.9 percent for “scheduled castes,” and 27 percent for “other backward classes,” 
compared with 15 percent for the rest of the population (Panda (2007a).  
Poverty is accompanied by widespread child malnutrition. According to a UNICEF 
study (2006), 47 percent of children under the age of five years were underweight, among the 
highest rates in the world (Bangladesh and Nepal have rates of 48 percent). In absolute 
numbers, India has 57 million underweight young children, the largest concentration in the 
world. Malnutrition at such levels is a humanitarian tragedy. In economic terms, it also has   7
dire consequences for the country’s future, because it is likely to constrain growth and 
productivity for the foreseeable future. Malnourished children are more likely to die, to suffer 
recurring illness later in life, and to have learning impairment. What happens to Indian 
children today will affect the economy for the next six decades.  
India produces about 210 million tons of food grains, mainly rice and wheat, which 
make up the staple food supply of the country. It was a large importer of food grains until the 
mid-1970s, but it has been self-sufficient and even a net exporter in most years during the last 
two decades. This turnaround was the result of the adoption of high-yielding varieties of 
seeds and chemical fertilizers, along with large public investments in irrigation. These 
measures made up what has come to be called the “green revolution” and also involved 
government procurement operations and guaranteed minimum support prices to farmers for 
food grains in some parts of the country. The increase in agricultural output since 1980–1981 
has been mostly due to a rise in yield per hectare attributable to the green revolution, rather 
than expansion of total area under cultivation.  
India has the second-largest potential labor force in the world, after China (ILO 
2007). However participation rates are relatively low and unemployment is high. The labor 
force participation rate was highest among “scheduled tribes” (51 percent), followed by 
“scheduled castes” (44 percent) and “other backward classes” (43 percent). For other groups, 
the participation rate was 40 percent.  
About 55 percent of the workforce continues to depend on agriculture as the main 
source of livelihood, although it contributes only 19 percent to overall GDP. The income of a 
typical worker in agriculture is one-fifth of a counterpart in nonagricultural sectors. The bulk 
of the rural poor consists of landless laborers and marginal farmers owning less than one 
hectare of land. The proportion of rural male workers engaged in the agricultural activities 
declined gradually from 81 percent in 1977–1978 to 67 percent in 2004–2005, whereas for   8
rural female workers, the decline was less, from 88 percent in 1977–1978 to 83 percent in 
2004–2005.  
Among urban workers, the largest source of employment for males was the “trade, 
hotel, and restaurant” sectoral grouping, which employed 28 percent of urban male workers, 
followed by manufacturing at 24 percent and “other services” at 21 percent. Between the 
1999–2000 and 2004–2005 surveys, the proportion of urban females employed in the 
manufacturing sector increased from 24 to 28 percent, while the share employed in the trade, 
hotel, and restaurant sector fell by 5 percent.  
According to projections prepared by the Government of India’s Planning 
Commission (2004), India’s labor force is expected to increase by about 160–170 million by 
2020, a growth of about 2 percent a year. The report estimates that to absorb this growing 
workforce as well as to offer employment to the 35 million persons unemployed or 
underemployed as of 2002, the country will need to generate about 200 million additional 
employment opportunities by 2020.  
Trade policy changes can have important effects on poverty—both positive, through 
improvements in export opportunities or lower prices, for example, and negative, if cheaper 
imports reduce the incomes of poor farmers or eliminate employment opportunities in some 
sectors without creating sufficient jobs in others. The country remains one of the less open 
economies among large developing countries, with average applied tariffs of 12.1 percent 
(14.1 percent including ad valorem equivalents) on nonagricultural products and 40.8 percent 
on agricultural products (World Trade Organization (2007c). Because such a high proportion 
of India’s labor force is still engaged in agriculture, and the sector is still the main reservoir 
of poverty in the country, liberalization of agricultural trade is likely to have a significant 
impact on Indian poverty.  
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3.  Analytical Framework 
The model:  The model of the Indian economy used in this study is the “STAGE” 
(Static Applied General Equilibrium) model developed by Scott McDonald. It is a member of 
the class of single-country CGE models that are descendants of the approach to CGE 
modeling described by Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982) and models reported by 
Robinson, Kilkenny, and Hanson (1990) and Kilkenny (1991). The model is a social 
accounting matrix–based CGE model, and the modeling approach has been influenced by 
Pyatt’s “SAM Approach to Modeling” (Pyatt 1987). We vary the standard closure of full 
employment of all labor with an alternative labor market closure meant to reflect 
unemployment and underemployment among unskilled laborers in India. The results we 
report are for this alternative. A short description of the model is presented in Appendix A.  
The social accounting matrix:  The social accounting matrix (SAM) used in this 
study was constructed by Scott McDonald, Manoj Panda and A. Ganesh-Kumar. It improves 
upon earlier SAMs for the Indian economy by incorporating detailed information on sources 
of incomes at the household level. Previous SAMs included extensive information on 
consumption expenditures but were less satisfactory regarding sources of household income.  
The distribution of Indian households by income, location (rural or urban), and social 
group as reflected in the model are presented in Tables 1 (countrywide distribution), 2 (rural 
distribution), and 3 (urban distribution). 
A description of the SAM is presented in Appendix B.  Table B.1 presents the 
macroeconomic totals for the SAM, while Table B.2 provides an overview of the Indian 
economy as represented in the model. 
The policy scenarios and simulations:  We use the model to simulate the impact on 
poverty and income distribution of changes in world agricultural prices for some key crops. 
These changes could arise as the result of trade or agricultural policy changes elsewhere in   10
the world, behavior by private actors, weather, or other causes. They shed light on potential 
effects of an agreement in the Doha round because such an agreement would require India (as 
well as other countries) to bind its tariffs at lower levels. As a result, the government would 
have less scope for raising tariffs to offset negative global price changes that could lower 
domestic farm incomes, the source of livelihood for a majority of Indian households.  On the 
other hand, households would face lower prices as consumers of these key commodities, 
which could offset the income effects. 
Because of their concerns about the impact of negative price shocks, India and other 
developing countries for which agriculture is a major source of employment and livelihoods 
have proposed that they be allowed special treatment in the Doha round to address this 
vulnerability. As noted above, a coalition known as the Group of Thirty-Three (G33), has 
proposed that developing countries be allowed to shield a certain number of “special 
products” from full tariff cuts because of their importance for livelihood security, food 
security, or rural development. They have also proposed that a “special safeguard 
mechanism” be created whereby they could temporarily raise tariffs to counter sharp changes 
in the price or volume of imports that could threaten local livelihoods. Our simulation sheds 
light on the need for such measures and their potential impact on poverty in India.  
Specifically, we simulate the impact on the Indian economy of a 25 percent decrease, 
a 50 percent decrease, a 25 percent increase, and a 50 percent increase in the world prices for 
rice and wheat, which are the most important food grains in India in terms of production and 
household consumption. These price changes would have stronger effects under a Doha 
agreement compared to bilateral or regional free trade agreements because Indian tariffs 
would be lowered toward all trading partners, including the lowest-cost producers. We use 
the model to probe the differential effects on different types of labor and on households of 
different social groups, at different income levels, and in rural and urban areas in order to   11
explore the consequences for income distribution and poverty.  Although world prices may 
not be transmitted perfectly to all households, price data for India show a considerable degree 
of linkage with world prices for rice and wheat (Conforti 2004).
5  In the case of rice, import 
prices move with world prices and within the domestic market prices are transmitted fairly 
completely between wholesale and retail and between producer and export prices. 
Global agricultural price swings of this magnitude are not uncommon, as seen in 
Figures 2 and 3. These changes can be caused by an array of factors, including weather, 
agricultural subsidies, changes in agricultural policy elsewhere in the world, dumping, 
anticompetitive behavior by private firms with market power, and other causes. In recent 
years, some agricultural prices have been increasing and may continue to do so in the short to 
medium term due to increases in demand that have not been matched by supply response. 
However increased prices are likely to induce supply responses over the medium term, and 
most economists believe that agricultural prices will continue their long-term declining trend.  
 
4.  Results 
We begin our analysis with the impact of changes in the price of rice on the overall 
Indian economy, including production and private consumption.  We then look at the impact 
on the incomes of households, disaggregated by income level, social type, and location.  
Finally we examine the impacts on factor markets in order to explore the channels through 
which the price changes affect poor households’ incomes.  Specifically, we examine the 
effects on demand for labor and on the income to factors, with labor disaggregated by 
                                                  
5 Changes in world prices may not be fully transmitted to all producers and households due to 
market imperfections, poor roads and other causes.  However all households are likely to feel 
some direct effect of world price changes and may also be affected through labor and land 
markets (Dyer et al 2005, Taylor et al 2003).  A reduction in tariffs is likely to increase price 
transmission (Brooks 2003). 
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education level and social type.  We then examine the impact of changes in the price of 
wheat. 
Changes in the world price of rice have strong effects on India. Both a 25 percent and 
a 50 percent decrease in the price have negative effects on all major components of the 
macroeconomy, including private consumption, government spending, investment, exports, 
imports, and total domestic production (Table 4). Interestingly, a 25 percent decrease in price 
has a negative impact that is more than half as large as a decrease of 50 percent; for most of 
the macroeconomic measures, the impact is two-thirds or more of the larger decrease. By 
contrast, increases of 25 percent or 50 percent in rice prices have positive effects on all 
macroeconomic measures and the increases are larger than the negative effects of 
corresponding price decreases, except for exports, where a price decline leads to a sharper 
drop in exports than the increase elicited by a price rise. The relative impact of different price 
increases also differs from that of price decreases; a 50 percent increase has an impact that is 
up to three times as large as that of a 25 percent increase.  
Turning to the impact on the welfare of Indian households, 78 percent of households 
experience real income losses from a decrease of either 25 or 50 percent in world rice prices 
(Table 5, Figure 4).
6 The distributional impact is regressive. Real income falls for all rural 
households except the richest 10 percent as a result of either price decrease, with the poorest 
households losing the most. The losses are most pronounced for disadvantaged groups in 
rural areas, including “scheduled tribes,” “scheduled castes,” and “other backward classes.” 
Rice cultivation is an important source of income for most poor rural Indian households, and 
                                                  
6 Real income in the model incorporates both earning and consumption (price) effects. The 
change in real income (also called welfare) is calculated as the Slutsky equivalent variation, a 
measurement of the minimum amount that one who gains from a change would be willing to 
accept to forgo the change.  Other researchers have found that, in general, trade affects 
households more strongly through the income channel (as producers and wage earners) than 
through the expenditure channel, as consumers (Hertel and Reimer 2004). 
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these results suggest that even moderate declines in the world price of rice would increase 
rural poverty.  
In urban areas, where households are net consumers of rice, the lowest income 
brackets of disadvantaged groups also experience small income losses. Most urban 
households feel little impact from the price declines. Only middle- and upper-income 
households realize gains of 0.1 percent or more.  
The likely channel through which the decrease in the price of rice affects poor urban 
households is the labor market.
7 The drop in rice prices reduces demand for unskilled labor in 
rice production sharply, by almost 12 percent in the case of a 50 percent decline, and reduces 
overall demand for labor in the agricultural sector (Figure 5). Displaced rural laborers spill 
over into urban unskilled labor markets. Although demand for labor increases slightly in 
manufacturing and services (in response to capital and other factors leaving rice for other 
sectors), the combined demand in those sectors grows less than the decrease in demand in 
agriculture. In the face of increased competition in the unskilled labor market, the incomes of 
illiterate workers (typically the least skilled) in urban areas decline, as is seen in Table 6.    
The distributional impact of an increase in world rice prices on Indian households is 
progressive and is larger than that induced by price declines (Table 5, Figure 6). The poorest 
rural households see real income gains of 1.4 to 2.2 percent from a 25 percent price increase 
and gains of 4 to 6.4 percent from an increase of 50 percent, with the disadvantaged groups 
gaining most. All rural households except the richest 10 percent would gain. Similarly, labor 
income increases for rural workers at all education levels and for both men and women; the 
largest gainers are illiterate workers and disadvantaged groups. The impact of a price increase 
on the incomes of urban households is more varied. Some poor households gain while others 
                                                  
7 Other recent work demonstrates how agricultural price shocks can be transmitted through 
labor and land markets. See, e.g., Dyer, Boucher, and Taylor (2005). 
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lose. The richest households are net losers. Illiterate urban workers from all disadvantaged 
groups see their incomes rise, while the results for other urban workers show a mix of small 
gains and small losses with no consistent pattern.  
Changes in the world price of wheat have much more muted impacts on the Indian 
economy than variations in the price of rice. Most macroeconomic variables are almost 
unchanged, except for imports, which increase by 1 percent in the case of a 50 percent price 
decline (Table 7). Effects at the household level are also smaller than for rice. The negative 
impact of a decrease in world wheat prices on rural households is much smaller than that of a 
decline in the price of rice, although the pattern is somewhat similar: poor households lose 
while richer households gain (Table 8, Figure 7). Urban households experience small gains at 
all income levels. Nonetheless, the overall effect could be to increase poverty, as 92 million 
rural households in the bottom six deciles of income experience some real income loss, while 
only 32 million urban households in the same deciles experience income gains (Tables 8, 1).  
Increases in the world price of wheat produce small gains for the poorest groups in 
rural areas and small losses for other rural and all urban households (Table 8, Figure 8).   
The increase in agricultural prices as simulated here comes through changes in world 
market prices, which would have stronger effects on India after it lowers its tariffs. However 
another study of the proposals for “special products” and a “special safeguard mechanism” in 
the Doha Round treats price increases as a surrogate for government action to mitigate global 
price declines through tariff measures (Ivanic and Martin 2006). In our view, an increase in 
world prices is not equivalent to a policy-induced domestic price change. However if the 
surrogate approach is taken, the impact of Indian government action to shield its domestic 
producers from a decline in the world price of rice would unambiguously be to reduce 
poverty and improve income distribution. In the case of wheat, government action could also   15
have a net poverty reducing effect, although the determination would require a careful 
analysis of the extent of gains and losses in poor and near-poor households. 
 
5.  Results of Other Studies of Trade Liberalization and Poverty 
Topalova (2005) conducts an ex post study of India’s trade liberalization in the 1990s 
using a difference-in-difference approach to poverty reduction across Indian districts.  She 
finds that regions which were more exposed to trade had less poverty reduction and that the 
results were driven by reductions in agricultural rather than manufacturing trade protection.   
Hertel et al (2008) conduct ex ante simulations of trade liberalization across fifteen 
developing countries (not including India) and find mixed results for poverty.  Full global 
trade liberalization would reduce poverty in a majority (nine) of the countries studied, while a 
more modest Doha round scenario would see poverty increase in a majority (eight) of 
countries.  Decomposing the drivers of poverty changes under Doha, the authors find that rich 
country agricultural reforms increase or leave poverty unchanged in ten countries, while poor 
country agricultural reforms do so in five countries.  The strongest poverty alleviating effects 
(greater than one percent reduction in the poverty headcount at $1/day) come from increased 
earnings for agricultural labor in the leading agricultural exporting countries in the study 
(Brazil, Chile, Thailand) as a result of rich countries’ reform of their agricultural policies.  
These gains are offset to some degree by increases in cost-of-living in those countries as a 
result of the same reforms, as more food is exported rather than sold at in the domestic 
market.   Agricultural trade reforms by poor countries have more muted effects, with the 
largest poverty reduction (for Thailand) amounting to about one-third of one percent. 
Parikh et al (1995, 1997) and Panda and Quizon (1999) use country-level models of 
India to probe the effects of trade liberalization on income distribution and poverty. These 
studies found that, in the short run, trade liberalization adversely affects both growth and   16
equity. In the long run, the liberalization of agriculture and manufacturing both have positive 
effects on growth, but their distributional effects differ. Liberalization in the manufacturing 
sector increases the real incomes of all groups, rich as well as poor, in both rural and urban 
sectors. However liberalization in the agricultural sector benefits only upper-income groups 
in rural areas and adversely affects all classes in urban areas. The simulation experiments 
show that the poor would need to be protected by safety net mechanisms, such as an 
expansion of public employment programs. Trade liberalization coupled with safety nets 
could lead to a Pareto-improving situation where both rich and poor in both rural and urban 
areas gain. In the long run, liberalization helps to modestly accelerate GDP growth (by about 
0.6 percent) through a more efficient allocation of resources across sectors and through an 
increase in the real investment rate. This occurs because the same nominal savings or 
investment rate leads to a higher real investment rate after the relative price of investment 
goods falls with the removal of protection on capital goods. The extent of poverty is reduced 
in the long run. 
Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe (2006) carry out an analysis of the 
impact of full global free trade in merchandise projected to 2015, using the World Bank’s 
recursive dynamic model, known as LINKAGE. Their results show very muted gains for 
India (which is the largest country in their “South Asia” aggregation), with real income only 
0.4 percent higher in 2015 compared with the baseline case without reform. Agricultural and 
food products imports rise by 165 percent, while exports rise by just 53 percent, resulting in 
an output loss of about 3.7 percent. Nevertheless, the authors find that the country’s food self-
sufficiency levels remain more or less intact and that there are welfare gains for unskilled 
labor and farmers. These results depend strongly on the assumptions chosen by the authors. 
In a sensitivity analysis, van der Mensbrugghe, one of the study’s authors, finds losses for 
India (that is, “South Asia”) in comparative static results that do not include the dynamic   17
model’s assumption that trade will induce additional investment and productivity gains (van 
der Mensbrugghe 2006a, 2006b). India also loses if standard GTAP assumptions about the 
elasticity of trade are used, rather than the more responsive elasticities chosen by Anderson, 
Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe. 
Given the relatively high levels of protection in the Indian economy, it might be 
expected that greater opening to trade would lead to much faster growth for the economy 
overall, which could contribute to poverty alleviation. However the result of these and other 
studies, (e.g., Ganesh-Kumar, Panda, and Burfisher 2006, Polaski 2006) show that the gains 
for the Indian economy from multilateral trade liberalization are surprisingly modest.  The 
distributional and poverty consequences of trade policy changes that expose the economy to 
greater price volatility in world agricultural markets thus loom larger against this backdrop. 
 
6.  Conclusions  
  This paper has examined the impact of changes in world agricultural prices on 
poverty and income distribution in India.  We find that a price decrease for rice, a key crop, 
lowers incomes of the poor, with sharp impacts on the poorest households.  The negative 
effects also carry over to the poorest urban households through the labor market channel.  
The impacts are of a magnitude that they could potentially offset most of the gains from Doha 
Round found in other studies.  Given the very low incomes of most Indian households and 
the country’s high poverty rate, this suggests that the question of agricultural trade 
liberalization should be evaluated carefully by the Indian government, as even short-term 
welfare losses for these households would be highly damaging.   
More broadly, our results demonstrate that the impact of world agricultural price 
changes on incomes and poverty depends on the specific patterns of production and 
consumption in a country and the specific distribution of poverty.  We demonstrate that factor   18
markets, particularly labor markets, must be examined in order to understand the full impact 
of food price changes on poverty in both rural and urban areas.  This focus has been absent in 
most studies and in popular discourse on the topic. 
It is probable that the poverty impact of agricultural price changes will vary among 
developing countries depending on the distribution of poverty, patterns of agricultural 
production and consumption, and unskilled labor market characteristics.  Therefore 
generalizations about the impact of agricultural price changes on poverty are likely to be 
misleading.  However, given the concentration of poverty in rural areas and in agriculture in 
most developing countries, there should be at least an initial presumption that agricultural 
price decreases could increase poverty. The presumption currently popular among many 
commentators and some economists that policy interventions in agricultural prices—such as 
tariffs and price supports—are likely to be poverty increasing finds little support in careful 
research and cannot be generalized to all developing countries.  
The assumption that the urban poor will always benefit from lower food prices is 
found in this study to be invalid for the poorest urban households in India.  Other careful 
studies of the distributional impact of agricultural price declines induced by trade policy 
changes find that the overall impact on poverty can be negative even when the urban poor 
gain, because of the greater concentration of poverty in the countryside or other reasons (e.g., 
Ravallion and Lokshin 2004; Hertel and Keeney 2006; Hertel et al. 2006). 
There are practical implications for the Doha round negotiations.  At least for India, 
our findings that decreases in the price of rice, and to a lesser extent, wheat, could increase 
and deepen poverty suggest that the government’s concern over potential negative effects of a 
Doha agreement on poverty and rural development is well founded.  The ability to use a 
“special products” designation and invoke a “special safeguard mechanism” would be 
necessary instruments for the Indian government to avoid negative effects on the poor in the   19
face of global price declines.  Given the varied impact of agricultural price changes on the 
poor in developing countries with differing patterns of poverty, production and consumption, 
policy discretion should be left to individual countries to deal with the specific impacts of 
world agricultural price changes on poverty, rather than having rigid disciplines imposed in 
advance. 
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Appendix A.  Description of the India Country Model  
The STAGE (Static Applied General Equilibrium) model (CGE) model
8 is a member 
of the class of single country computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that are 
descendants of the approach to CGE modeling described by Dervis et al., (1982) and models 
reported by Robinson et al., (1990) and Kilkenny (1991). The model is implemented using 
the GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) software. The model is a SAM based CGE 
model, and the modeling approach has been influenced by Pyatt’s “SAM Approach to 
Modeling” (Pyatt, 1988). 
The description of the model proceeds in two stages. The first stage is the 
identification of the behavioural relationships; while the second stage illustrates the price and 
quantity systems embodied within the model. 
Behavioral Relationships 
The behavioral relationships in this model are a mix of non-linear and linear 
relationships that govern how the model’s agents will respond to exogenously determined 
changes in the model’s parameters and/or variables. 
Households choose the bundles of commodities they consume to maximise utility 
where the utility function is a Stone-Geary function that allows for subsistence consumption 
expenditures, which is an arguably realistic assumption when there are substantial numbers 
of very poor consumers. The households choose their consumption bundles from a set of 
‘composite’ commodities that are Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregates of 
domestically produced and imported commodities, which are imperfect substitutes. This is 
the so-called Armington “insight” (Armington, 1969), which allows for product 
differentiation via the assumption of imperfect substitution (see Devarajan et al., 1994). The 
                                                  
8  The STAGE model is fully documented in McDonald 2006, available from the 
author:  smcdonald@brookes.ac.uk   24
assumption has the advantage of rendering the model practical by avoiding the extreme 
specialisation and price fluctuations associated with other trade assumptions. In this model 
the country is assumed to be a price taker for all imported commodities. 
Domestic production uses a two-stage production process. In the first stage aggregate 
intermediate and aggregate primary inputs are combined using CES technology. At the 
second stage intermediate inputs are used in fixed proportions relative to the aggregate 
intermediate input used by each activity, while primary inputs are combined to form 
aggregate value added using CES technologies, with the optimal ratios of primary inputs 
being determined by relative factor prices. The activities are defined as multi-product 
activities with commodities differentiated by source activity. Total commodity demands are 
determined by the domestic demand for domestically produced commodities and export 
demand. Assuming imperfect transformation between the domestic and export commodities 
the optimal distribution between the domestic and export markets is determined using 
Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) functions. The model can be specified as a 
small country, i.e., price taker, on all export markets, or selected export commodities can face 
downward sloping export demand functions, i.e., a large country assumption. 
The model is set up with a range of flexible closure rules. The base model contains 
the assumption that all factors are fully employed and mobile; however this assumption is 
questionable with respect to unskilled labor in India. We vary the standard assumption with 
an alternative labor market closure for unskilled labor in which the real wage is held constant 
and the supply of unskilled labor is assumed to be infinitely elastic at that wage.  As a result, 
it is labor supply that clears the market, and any shock that would otherwise increase 
(decrease) the equilibrium wage will instead lead to increased (decreased) employment.  The 
results we report are for this alternative.   25
Price and Quantity Relationships 
Figures A.1 and A.2 provide an overview of the interrelationships between the prices 
and quantities. The supply prices of the composite commodities (PQSc) are defined as the 
weighted averages of the domestically produced commodities that are consumed domestically 
(PDc) and the domestic prices of imported commodities (PMc), which are defined as the 
products of the world prices of commodities (PWMc) and the exchange rate (ER) uplifted by 
ad valorem import duties (tmc). Consumer prices for commodities (PQDc) are defined as 
supply prices plus (ad valorem) sales taxes (tsc). The producer prices of commodities (PXCc) 
are weighted averages of the prices received for domestically produced commodities sold on 
domestic and export (PEc) markets. The prices received on the export market are the products 
of the world price of exports (PWEc) and the exchange rate (ER) less any ad valorem export 
duties (tec). 
The average price per unit of output received by an activity (PXa) is defined as the 
weighted average of the domestic producer prices. The prices of value added (PVAa), i.e., the 
amount available to pay primary inputs, are defined as activity prices less indirect taxes (txa) 
and payments for intermediate inputs (PINTa), where the (aggregate) intermediate input 
prices are defined as the weighted sums of the prices of the inputs (PQDc). 
Total demands for the composite commodities, QQc, consist of demands for 
intermediate inputs, QINTDc, consumption by households, QCDc, enterprises, QENTDc, and 
government, QGDc, gross fixed capital formation, QINVDc, and stock changes, dstocconstc. 
Supplies from domestic producers, QDc, plus imports, QMc, meet these demands. 
Commodities are delivered to both the domestic and export, QEc, markets subject to 
equilibrium conditions that exhaust all domestic commodity production, QXCc. Domestic 
production by commodity is an aggregate of the quantities of that commodity produced by a 
number of different activities (QXACa,c).   26
Production relationships by activities are defined as nested CES production functions. 
The nesting structure is illustrated in lower part of Figure A.2, where, for illustration 
purposes only, two intermediate inputs and three primary inputs (FDk,a, FD11,a and FDl2,a) are 
identified. Activity output is a CES aggregate of the quantities of aggregate intermediate 
inputs (QINTa) and value added (QVAa), while aggregate intermediate inputs are a Leontief 
aggregate of the (individual) intermediate inputs and aggregate value added is a CES 
aggregate of the quantities of primary inputs demanded by each activity (FDf,a).   27
 Appendix B.  Description of the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and Data for the Model 
  The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) reports all the flows of receipts accruing to and 
expenditures incurred by all the agents in the economy for a particular year. The agents in the 
economy are typically the production sectors, social groups (households), firms, government and 
the foreign sector. These flows take place on account of commodity transactions (buying-selling) 
between the agents for purposes of consumption, intermediate use, investment, etc., and by way 
of inter-agent transfers. The SAM is constructed in two stages. The first is a ‘macro SAM’ that 
presents the aggregates of these flows for the economy as a whole. Next is the ‘micro SAM’ that 
disaggregates the commodities, activities, factors and households into their respective 
components. This top down approach is adopted in preference to the UN System of National 
Accounts preferred bottom-up method to ensure that the final micro SAM is consistent with the 
published national accounts aggregates. 
The Macro SAM  
Table B.1 gives the structure of the macro SAM, and the flow values for the year 1998-
99. Most of the data for the macro SAM come from the Input-Output (IO) Table for 1998-99 
and from the National Accounts Statistics (NAS), both prepared by the Central Statistical 
Organization (CSO), Government of India. It must be noted here that the IO Table is 
balanced and is consistent with the NAS data available at the time of its preparation. 
However, all the revisions that the NAS undergoes after the preparation of the IO Table are 
not carried over to the IO Table. Thus, there are some small differences in the macro 
aggregates between these two sources. Where such differences are observed, we defer to the 
values in the IO Table due to its internal consistency across its rows and columns. These two 
data sources are supplemented with data on government transfers from Pradhan et al (2005).  
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Some of the entries of the macro SAM are derived residually to maintain row – column 
balance. In the rest of world (RoW) account, data are available for all the row entries, and for 
all the column entries except capital transfers to RoW. The latter was then obtained residually 
as the difference between the row total and sum of column entries for which we have data. 
Next, we worked out the net household savings in the gross fixed capital account row 
residually as the difference between the column total (for which we had all the information) 
and the sum of the row entries for which we had data. Factor payments to households, firms 
and government were also derived sequentially following a similar procedure.  
The Micro SAM  
The macro SAM gives a snap shot of the economy and also provides several control totals 
for the micro SAM. The micro SAM distinguishes 115 commodities, 115 activities, 49 
factors and 352 households. The 115 commodities and 115 activities directly correspond to 
the IO Table. With regard to factors, we distinguish 1 capital (non-labor) and 48 labor types 
based on the following characteristics:  
•  location (rural / urban) 
•  social group (“scheduled tribes” / “scheduled castes” / “other backward classes”/ 
others) 
•  education level (illiterate / education up to high school / graduates and above) 
•  sex (male / female).  
Households are distinguished into 352 types based on the following characteristics: 
•  location (rural / urban) 
•  social group (“scheduled tribes” / “scheduled castes” / “other backward classes” / 
others)   29
•  region (north / east / west / south) 
•  eleven mean per capita expenditure (MPCE) classes (the first nine deciles in the 
sample, and the top decile further split into 91-95 percentile and 96 to 100 percentile). 
Database  
The data for the micro SAM are from (a) the IO Table mentioned earlier, (b) unit 
(household) level data from sample surveys on Consumer Expenditure and Employment / 
Unemployment 55
th Round for 1999-2000 carried out by the National Sample Survey 
Organization (NSSO), (c) Pradhan and Roy (2003), and (d) Pradhan et al (2005). The IO 
Table gives data on intermediate flows (use matrix), sectoral value added, the commodity 
composition (make) matrix, and commodity-wise total private consumption and other final 
demand vectors. Of these, the use matrix, make matrix, and the final demands (except 
private) are used directly in the micro SAM.  
Distribution of Factor Income  
  The sectoral value added from the IO Table is distributed first into labor and capital 
(non-labor) based on the labor-capital shares derived from Pradhan et al (2005). The value 
added accruing to labor is then distributed to the 48 labor types based on information from 
the NSSO Employment / Unemployment survey. The survey provides information on 
household characteristics (location, social group, region and mean per capita expenditure), 
characteristics of each household member (age, sex and education level), employment status 
(usually employed / unemployed) and for those who are employed, the sector of usual 
employment (at NIC 5-digit level) and the total wages received during the week preceding 
the survey. From the unit level data, we first generate the labor types as described earlier. 
Second, for each labor type the sector of employment was mapped from the NIC 5-digit level 
to our 115 sector level, and the deployment of each labor type by sector was generated. Third,   30
for each labor type an average daily wage rate was constructed from the data on wages 
available at the unit level. With the sectoral employment and average wage information we 
could obtain sectoral wage income for each labor type. The structure implied by this data was 
used to disaggregate the total sectoral labor value added from the IO Table across our 48 
labor types by adjusting the wage rate for each labor type.  
Household Labor Endowment 
  The household characteristics reported in the Employment / Unemployment survey 
enables us to construct household groups as defined above. For each of these household 
categories, we then develop the total endowment of different types of labor from the unit 
level information. Given the characteristics used to classify labor types, every household 
category will have more than one labor type. This information on labor endowments and the 
wage rates obtained above are used to generate total labor income for each household 
category.  
Household Consumption Expenditure 
  The NSSO Consumption Expenditure provides information on household 
characteristics (location, social group, region and mean per capita expenditure) and also 
detailed information on commodity-wise consumptions at the household level. The common 
information on household characteristics from the two NSSO surveys enables us to use a 
consistent definition of household categories across both surveys. Thus, for our 352 
household categories we develop the commodity-wise consumption expenditures by mapping 
the detailed commodity list in the survey to the 115 commodities in the IO Table. It is well 
known that the aggregate total consumption expenditure from survey usually do not tally with 
the estimates of consumption from the NAS data due to differences in the methodology of the 
two approaches and their coverage. Since the IO Table is the main basis for the SAM, we use   31
the consumption structure across households from the survey and apply them on the 
commodity-wise total private consumption expenditure reported in the IO Table. This enables 
us to maintain internal consistency in the SAM.  
Household Income Expenditure Balance 
  Thus far we have only labor income and consumption expenditure for each 
household, which is insufficient to close the income-expenditure accounts for households. 
Detailed data on savings, transfers, and non-labor income are not available for our household 
categories. The NCAER-MIMAP Survey (Pradhan and Roy 2003) allows us to compute 
decile-wise savings / dis-savings rates for rural and urban areas separately. We have assumed 
that these rates prevail for each decile within rural and urban independent of other household 
characteristics namely region and social group. Thus we could generate household savings. 
Total household income was then obtained with certain assumptions on the distribution of 
direct taxes and transfers. Given this total income and the wage income estimated earlier, 
income from capital (non-labor factors) was obtained for all the household categories.    32
Table 1. Distribution of Households in the Indian Population, Total 
 
Household Group  Number  Share 
Rural       
Rural "scheduled tribes," income 0-30 percent  8,070,164  4.28
Rural "scheduled tribes," income 31-60 percent  4,119,474  2.19
Rural "scheduled tribes," income 61-90 percent  2,378,644  1.26
Rural "scheduled tribes," income >90 percent  372,694  0.20
        
Rural "scheduled castes," income 0-30 percent  13,393,888  7.11
Rural "scheduled castes," income 31-60 percent  9,300,193  4.94
Rural "scheduled castes," income 61-90 percent  5,545,583  2.94
Rural "scheduled castes," income >90 percent  923,481  0.49
        
Rural "other backward classes," income 0-30 percent  17,932,008  9.52
Rural "other backward classes," income 31-60 percent  16,982,923  9.01
Rural "other backward classes," income 61-90 percent  13,312,988  7.07
Rural "other backward classes," income >90 percent  2,697,944  1.43
        
Other rural, income 0-30 percent  9,042,016  4.80
Other rural, income 31-60 percent  13,205,395  7.01
Other rural, income 61-90 percent  14,608,818  7.75
Other rural, income >90 percent  5,278,772  2.80
        
Urban       
Urban "scheduled tribes," income 0-30 percent  860,491  0.46
Urban "scheduled tribes," income 31-60 percent  515,517  0.27
Urban "scheduled tribes," income 61-90 percent  341,136  0.18
Urban "scheduled tribes," income >90 percent  77,309  0.04
        
Urban "scheduled castes," income 0-30 percent  3,736,578  1.98
Urban "scheduled castes," income 31-60 percent  2,110,141  1.12
Urban "scheduled castes," income 61-90 percent  1,110,004  0.59
Urban "scheduled castes," income >90 percent  160,863  0.09
        
Urban "other backward classes," income 0-30 percent  6,256,092  3.32
Urban "other backward classes," income 31-60 percent  4,850,576  2.57
Urban "other backward classes," income 61-90 percent  3,604,215  1.91
Urban "other backward classes," income >90 percent  730,890  0.39
        
Other urban, income 0-30 percent  6,114,311  3.24
Other urban, income 31-60 percent  7,802,559  4.14
Other urban, income 61-90 percent  9,314,989  4.94
Other urban, income >90 percent  3,680,458  1.95
        
All households  188,431,114  100.00
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Table 2. Distribution of Rural Households 
 
Household Group  Number  Share 
        
Rural "scheduled tribes," income 0-30 percent  8,070,164  5.88
Rural "scheduled tribes," income 31-60 percent  4,119,474  3.00
Rural "scheduled tribes," income 61-90 percent  2,378,644  1.73
Rural "scheduled tribes," income >90 percent  372,694  0.27
        
Rural "scheduled castes," income 0-30 percent  13,393,888  9.76
Rural "scheduled castes," income 31-60 percent  9,300,193  6.78
Rural "scheduled castes," income 61-90 percent  5,545,583  4.04
Rural "scheduled castes," income >90 percent  923,481  0.67
        
Rural "other backward classes," income 0-30 percent  17,932,008  13.07
Rural "other backward classes," income 31-60 percent  16,982,923  12.38
Rural "other backward classes," income 61-90 percent  13,312,988  9.71
Rural "other backward classes," income >90 percent  2,697,944  1.97
        
Other rural, income 0-30 percent  9,042,016  6.59
Other rural, income 31-60 percent  13,205,395  9.63
Other rural, income 61-90 percent  14,608,818  10.65
Other rural, income >90 percent  5,278,772  3.85
        
All rural households  137,164,985  100.00
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Table 3. Distribution of Urban Households 
 
Household Group  Number  Share 
        
Urban "scheduled tribes," income 0-30 percent  860,491  1.68
Urban "scheduled tribes," income 31-60 percent  515,517  1.01
Urban "scheduled tribes," income 61-90 percent  341,136  0.67
Urban "scheduled tribes," income >90 percent  77,309  0.15
        
Urban "scheduled castes," income 0-30 percent  3,736,578  7.29
Urban "scheduled castes," income 31-60 percent  2,110,141  4.12
Urban "scheduled castes," income 61-90 percent  1,110,004  2.17
Urban "scheduled castes," income >90 percent  160,863  0.31
        
Urban "other backward classes," income 0-30 percent  6,256,092  12.20
Urban "other backward classes," income 31-60 percent  4,850,576  9.46
Urban "other backward classes," income 61-90 percent  3,604,215  7.03
Urban "other backward classes," income >90 percent  730,890  1.43
        
Other urban, income 0-30 percent  6,114,311  11.93
Other urban, income 31-60 percent  7,802,559  15.22
Other urban, income 61-90 percent  9,314,989  18.17
Other urban, income >90 percent  3,680,458  7.18
        
All urban households  51,266,129  100.00
 
Note: Data for Tables 1, 2, and 3 are from the "Household Schedule: Consumer Expenditure" in National 
Sample Survey Organisation, National Sample Survey (55th Round), July 1999-June 2000. The number 
of households in each category are scaled from the sample to the population level using the multipliers 
given in the survey.  
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Table 4. Impact of a Change in the World Price of Rice on India's Economy 
(percent change from baseline) 
 
Macroeconomic indicator 
World price of 
rice decreases 
by 25 percent 
World price of 
rice decreases 
by 50 percent 
World price of 
rice increases 
by 25 percent  
World price of 
rice increases 
by 50 percent  
Private consumption   -0.16  -0.24  0.30  0.84 
Government consumption  -0.09  -0.12  0.17  0.52 
Investment consumption  -0.19  -0.28  0.39  1.20 
Absorption -0.16  -0.24  0.31  0.89 
Import demand   -0.88  -1.28  1.82  5.62 
Export supply   -0.64  -1.24  0.60  1.08 
Total domestic production   -0.12  -0.17  0.23  0.70 
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Table 5.  Impact of a Change in the World Price of Rice on the Real Incomes of Indian 
Households  



























Rural             
Rural "scheduled tribes," income 0-30 percent  -1.13  -1.65  2.20  6.40
Rural "scheduled tribes," income 31-60 percent  -0.60  -0.89  1.16  3.32
Rural "scheduled tribes," income 61-90 percent  -0.20  -0.29  0.36  0.98
Rural "scheduled tribes," income >90 percent  0.01  0.02  -0.04  -0.17
              
Rural "scheduled castes," income 0-30 percent  -0.95  -1.40  1.85  5.36
Rural "scheduled castes," income 31-60 percent  -0.76  -1.12  1.49  4.35
Rural "scheduled castes," income 61-90 percent  -0.31  -0.46  0.59  1.69
Rural "scheduled castes," income >90 percent  0.02  0.03  -0.05  -0.19
              
Rural "other backward classes," income 0-30 percent  -0.78  -1.14  1.50  4.33
Rural "other backward classes," income 31-60 percent  -0.70  -1.03  1.38  4.02
Rural "other backward classes," income 61-90 percent  -0.46  -0.67  0.90  2.64
Rural "other backward classes," income >90 percent  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.06
              
Other rural, income 0-30 percent  -0.73  -1.08  1.41  4.05
Other rural, income 31-60 percent  -0.62  -0.91  1.21  3.49
Other rural, income 61-90 percent  -0.46  -0.67  0.89  2.60
Other rural, income >90 percent  -0.07  -0.10  0.12  0.34
              
Urban             
Urban "scheduled tribes," income 0-30 percent  -0.12  -0.18  0.20  0.50
Urban "scheduled tribes," income 31-60 percent  -0.04  -0.06  0.05  0.09
Urban "scheduled tribes," income 61-90 percent  0.01  0.01  -0.03  -0.11
Urban "scheduled tribes," income >90 percent  0.02  0.03  -0.05  -0.18
              
Urban "scheduled castes," income 0-30 percent  -0.10  -0.15  0.17  0.43
Urban "scheduled castes," income 31-60 percent  -0.02  -0.03  0.01  -0.02
Urban "scheduled castes," income 61-90 percent  0.01  0.01  -0.03  -0.13
Urban "scheduled castes," income >90 percent  0.02  0.03  -0.05  -0.17
              
Urban "other backward classes," income 0-30 percent  -0.02  -0.03  0.01  -0.04
Urban "other backward classes," income 31-60 percent  0.05  0.07  -0.13  -0.42
Urban "other backward classes," income 61-90 percent  0.07  0.10  -0.16  -0.50
Urban "other backward classes," income >90 percent  0.04  0.06  -0.10  -0.31
              
Other urban, income 0-30 percent  0.03  0.05  -0.10  -0.37
Other urban, income 31-60 percent  0.09  0.13  -0.20  -0.63
Other urban, income 61-90 percent  0.11  0.16  -0.23  -0.72
Other urban, income >90 percent  0.09  0.13  -0.19  -0.58
              
Total -0.13  -0.19  0.23  0.64
   37
Table 6. Impact of a Change in the World Price of Rice on the Income to Factors in India 



























Capital  8483.87 -0.05 -0.08 0.08 0.17
                 
Rural labor                
Rural "scheduled tribes," illiterate males  78.97  -1.01  -1.47  2.03  6.06
Rural "scheduled tribes," illiterate females  60.00  -1.10  -1.60  2.22  6.62
Rural "scheduled tribes," some school males  144.56  -0.91  -1.32  1.82  5.45
Rural "scheduled tribes," some school females  32.82  -0.98  -1.43  1.97  5.90
Rural "scheduled tribes," graduate males  23.59  -0.33  -0.49  0.64  1.83
Rural "scheduled tribes," graduate females  1.75  -1.07  -1.56  2.14  6.37
                 
Rural "scheduled castes," illiterate males  134.00  -0.96  -1.39  1.93  5.76
Rural "scheduled castes," illiterate females  73.52  -1.14  -1.66  2.30  6.87
Rural "scheduled castes," some school males  255.35  -0.79  -1.15  1.59  4.73
Rural "scheduled castes," some school females  37.21  -0.81  -1.18  1.62  4.83
Rural "scheduled castes," graduate males  40.03  -0.44  -0.65  0.87  2.53
Rural "scheduled castes," graduate females  3.74  -0.32  -0.48  0.61  1.73
                 
Rural "other backward classes," illiterate males  184.27  -0.89  -1.30  1.79  5.35
Rural "other backward classes," illiterate female  111.60  -1.00  -1.45  2.01  6.01
Rural "other backward classes," some school ma  460.39  -0.69  -1.01  1.39  4.14
Rural "other backward classes," some school fe  98.46  -0.72  -1.06  1.45  4.33
Rural "other backward classes," graduate males  85.99  -0.47  -0.70  0.93  2.70
Rural "other backward classes," graduate female  7.32  -0.39  -0.57  0.75  2.16
                 
Other rural illiterate males  123.14  -0.91  -1.32  1.83  5.46
Other rural illiterate females  77.63  -0.86  -1.25  1.72  5.12
Other rural some school males  566.43  -0.72  -1.05  1.44  4.28
Other rural some school females  168.06  -0.63  -0.93  1.26  3.74
Other rural graduate males  222.37  -0.41  -0.60  0.80  2.32
Other rural graduate females  20.41  -0.30  -0.44  0.56  1.59
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Table 6. Impact of a Change in the World Price of Rice on the Income to Factors in India  




























Urban labor                
Urban "scheduled tribes," illiterate males  23.41  -0.15  -0.22  0.28  0.80
Urban "scheduled tribes," illiterate females  6.97  -0.34  -0.50  0.68  2.01
Urban "scheduled tribes," some school males  91.50  -0.02  -0.04  0.02  -0.01
Urban "scheduled tribes," some school females  14.84  0.01  0.02  -0.05  -0.21
Urban "scheduled tribes," graduate males  48.78  0.01  0.02  -0.06  -0.27
Urban "scheduled tribes," graduate females  8.68  -0.02  -0.04  0.01  -0.04
                 
Urban "scheduled castes," illiterate males  80.73  -0.08  -0.12  0.14  0.38
Urban "scheduled castes," illiterate females  31.36  -0.22  -0.33  0.43  1.25
Urban "scheduled castes," some school males  247.87  0.01  0.01  -0.04  -0.17
Urban "scheduled castes," some school females  20.94  -0.10  -0.15  0.17  0.43
Urban "scheduled castes," graduate males  67.39  -0.03  -0.05  0.02  -0.02
Urban "scheduled castes," graduate females  6.67  -0.16  -0.24  0.28  0.74
                 
Urban "other backward classes," illiterate  males 99.97 -0.05 -0.07 0.08 0.21
Urban "other backward classes," illiterate  female  34.42 -0.09 -0.13 0.17 0.48
Urban "other backward classes," some school ma  435.56  0.06  0.08  -0.14  -0.45
Urban "other backward classes," some school fe  52.79  0.03  0.04  -0.08  -0.27
Urban "other backward classes," graduate males  173.31  -0.04  -0.06  0.04  0.04
Urban "other backward classes," graduate female  22.39  -0.12  -0.18  0.20  0.49
                 
Other  urban  illiterate  males  89.77 0.02 0.02  -0.05  -0.19
Other urban illiterate females  25.08  -0.03  -0.05  0.05  0.13
Other urban some school males  644.03  0.13  0.18  -0.28  -0.88
Other urban some school females  99.96  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.12
Other urban graduate males  672.88  0.04  0.06  -0.12  -0.42
Other urban graduate females  153.37  -0.08  -0.13  0.13  0.30
                 
All  labor  6164.27 -0.36 -0.52 0.70 2.05
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Table 7. Impact of a Change in the World Price of Wheat on India's Economy 
(percent change from baseline) 
 
Macroeconomic indicator 








World price of 
wheat 
increases by 
25 percent  
World price of 
wheat 
increases by 
50 percent  
Private consumption   0.03  0.10  -0.02  -0.03 
Government  consumption  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Investment  consumption  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absorption  0.02  0.06 -0.01 -0.02 
Import demand   0.27  1.00  -0.12  -0.19 
Export  supply    0.12  0.33 -0.07 -0.13 
Total domestic production   0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00 
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Table 8. Impact of a Change in the World Price of Wheat on Real Incomes of Indian 
Households 



























Rural             
Rural "scheduled tribes," income 0-30 percent  -0.08  -0.22  0.05  0.09
Rural "scheduled tribes," income 31-60 percent  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.01
Rural "scheduled tribes," income 61-90 percent  0.04  0.11  -0.02  -0.04
Rural "scheduled tribes," income >90 percent  0.04  0.10  -0.02  -0.04
              
Rural "scheduled castes," income 0-30 percent  -0.04  -0.10  0.02  0.04
Rural "scheduled castes," income 31-60 percent  -0.04  -0.11  0.03  0.05
Rural "scheduled castes," income 61-90 percent  0.01  0.04  -0.01  -0.01
Rural "scheduled castes," income >90 percent  0.04  0.11  -0.02  -0.04
              
Rural "other backward classes," income 0-30 percent  -0.02  -0.04  0.01  0.02
Rural "other backward classes," income 31-60 percent  -0.04  -0.11  0.03  0.05
Rural "other backward classes," income 61-90 percent  -0.03  -0.09  0.02  0.04
Rural "other backward classes," income >90 percent  0.03  0.08  -0.02  -0.03
              
Other rural, income 0-30 percent  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.01
Other rural, income 31-60 percent  -0.02  -0.04  0.01  0.02
Other rural, income 61-90 percent  -0.02  -0.06  0.02  0.03
Other rural, income >90 percent  0.01  0.04  -0.01  -0.01
Urban             
Urban "scheduled tribes," income 0-30 percent  0.06  0.18  -0.04  -0.06
Urban "scheduled tribes," income 31-60 percent  0.05  0.14  -0.03  -0.05
Urban "scheduled tribes," income 61-90 percent  0.04  0.11  -0.02  -0.04
Urban "scheduled tribes," income >90 percent  0.03  0.09  -0.02  -0.03
              
Urban "scheduled castes," income 0-30 percent  0.07  0.19  -0.04  -0.07
Urban "scheduled castes," income 31-60 percent  0.06  0.16  -0.03  -0.06
Urban "scheduled castes," income 61-90 percent  0.04  0.12  -0.03  -0.05
Urban "scheduled castes," income >90 percent  0.03  0.09  -0.02  -0.03
              
Urban "other backward classes," income 0-30 percent  0.07  0.20  -0.04  -0.07
Urban "other backward classes," income 31-60 percent  0.06  0.18  -0.04  -0.07
Urban "other backward classes," income 61-90 percent  0.05  0.14  -0.03  -0.05
Urban "other backward classes," income >90 percent  0.03  0.09  -0.02  -0.04
              
Other urban, income 0-30 percent  0.07  0.21  -0.05  -0.08
Other urban, income 31-60 percent  0.06  0.18  -0.04  -0.07
Other urban, income 61-90 percent  0.05  0.15  -0.03  -0.06
Other urban, income >90 percent  0.04  0.12  -0.03  -0.05
              
Total 0.03  0.07  -0.02  -0.03
 
 













* Using revised PPP estimates (forthcoming)
Number of persons (millions) Percentage of population
 
Figure 1. Poverty in India, 2004-2005   42

























































Note: Figures given are for Thai 5 percent broken milled rice. 
Source: World Bank, “Commodity Markets Briefs: Rice.” 
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Note: Figures given are for U.S. hard red winter wheat varieties. 
Source: World Bank, “Commodity Markets Briefs: Wheat.” 
 




















Figure 4. Impact of a Decrease in the World Price of Rice on Indian Households 
(percent change in real income relative to baseline nominal income to households) 



















Figure 5. Impact of a Decrease in the World Price of Rice on the Demand for Indian Labor 
(percent change in demand for labor relative to baseline)  






















Figure 6. Impact of an Increase in the World Price of Rice on Indian Households 






















Figure 7. Impact of a Decrease in the World Price of Wheat on Indian Households 
(percent change in real income relative to baseline nominal income to households) 






















Figure 8. Impact of an Increase in the World Price of Wheat on Indian Households 
(percent change in real income relative to baseline nominal income to households) 
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world  Total 
Commodity 0  1400115  0  1189267 0 0 0 0 0  0 214032 395147 -2125 199691 3396127 
Activity  2998241 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 2998241 
Factors    0  1598127  0  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 8133 1606260 
Households 0  0  1322790 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 118430 0 0 43242 1484463 
Private 
Firms  0 0  40250  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 5722 0 0 0 45972 
Public Firms   0  0  15129  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 15129 
Direct  taxes  0 0 0  28317 24529 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 52846 
Import 
duties    40668 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 40668 
Export 




111587 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 111587 
Government 0 0  36923 0 0 0 52846 40668 -697  111587 0 0 0 0 241327 
Gross fixed 
capital  0 0  168066  266879 21443 15129 0 0 0  0 -99530 0 0 21035 393022 
Changes in 
stocks  0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 -2125 0 0 -2125 
Rest of 
world  246327 0  23101  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 2673 0 0 0 272101 
Total  3396126 2998242 1606260  1484463 45972 15129 52846 40668 -697 111587 241327 393022 -2125 272101      50
Table B.2.  Overview of the Indian Economy as Represented in the India Model 
(Domestic production by industry in rupees and percent share) 
 
Industry  Rupees (billion)  Share of total economy 
Rice 641.60 2.23
Wheat 449.54 1.56
Plant-based fibers  143.72 0.50
Oil seeds  168.08 0.58
Other crops  1,645.26 5.72
Other animal products  558.36 1.94
        
Coal 246.22 0.86
Oil and gas  131.49 0.46
        
Dairy products  478.16 1.66
Vegetable oils and fats  376.14 1.31
Other food products  1,613.64 5.61
        
Textiles 1,067.74 3.71
Wearing apparel  129.81 0.45
Petroleum products  498.72 1.73
Chemicals 1,856.07 6.45
Minerals and metals  1,428.50 4.97
Vehicles and other transport equipment  509.17 1.77
Other manufacturing  2,711.53 9.43
        
Utilities 1,205.66 4.19
Construction 2,085.46 7.25
Trade and transportation  4,938.71 17.17
Dwellings 805.57 2.80
Public administration  2,151.50 7.48
Services 2,919.27 10.15
        
Total production  28,759.92 100
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Figure A.2: Quantity Relationships for the Model  
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